In addition to the infrastructure, it is planned to include another 42 tankers on the list, which confirms the scale of the “inventory” of the shadow segment.
Behind the quantitative indicators lies a qualitative change in the tactics of the sanctioning entities. Brussels has realized that a simple blockade of vessels is ineffective: VG has already thoroughly analyzed cases where tankers, after being excluded from classification societies or losing their insurance, simply changed name, owner, and flag, continuing operations through chains of offshore companies. Now the EU is targeting financial schemes—sanctions now affect banks in Tajikistan, Laos, and Kyrgyzstan that facilitated transactions bypassing Western systems.
The daily life of the shadow fleet in recent years resembles an endless series with constant changes of scenery. Under pressure from secondary sanctions, Barbados and Panama have begun to mass revoke flags from vessels suspected of transporting Russian oil. This has triggered a migration of the fleet to jurisdictions such as Gabon or the Comoros Islands but has not stopped the flow. The “gray” fleet has a phenomenal ability to regenerate: for every operator company, like the Indian Gatik, that is liquidated, several less noticeable entities instantly emerge.
The new EU initiative aims to deprive these vessels of basic subsistence capabilities. Restrictions on bunkering, repairs, and any technical maintenance at ports are an attempt to force “shadow operators” into a state of complete autonomy, which is technically impossible for aging vessels that make up the backbone of the gray fleet.
“Sanctions against the shadow fleet are not something fundamentally new in themselves: after all, both the EU and the UK have repeatedly imposed restrictions on tankers transporting Russian oil.
Restrictions on servicing the shadow fleet's vessels in any EU seaports could pose a much greater danger.
This includes not only insurance services but also all other operations, from transshipment of oil in the territorial waters of EU countries to vessels docking in seaports. “Second-type” restrictions could complicate export logistics, consequently increasing the costs of exporting oil and petroleum products,” said Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, to VG.
Despite the resolute tone of the European Commission, there is no monolith within the EU itself. Greece and Malta—countries with solid commercial fleets—have already spoken out against a ban on services for transporting oil from Russia. For Athens, maritime shipping represents not only budget revenues but also a lever of influence in the global division of labor. Restricting the operations of Greek tankers with Russian raw materials automatically hands the market over to Asian or Middle Eastern players, which does not add optimism to Mediterranean shipowners.
“Brussels is trying to impose political rules on a market that is inherently global and anarchic. We see that even with the introduction of strict measures, loopholes remain. The lifting of sanctions from two Chinese banks amid pressure on Central Asian banks is a clear nod to Beijing. It is an acknowledgment that without China’s involvement, any attempt to financially blockade maritime exports becomes a fiction,” notes a source in the maritime trade industry.
Indeed, the selectivity of sanctions underscores their political underpinnings. By targeting the ports of Georgia and Indonesia, the EU is attempting to set a precedent that will prompt other neutral harbors to reconsider the risks. However, logistics always seeks the path of least resistance. Rising freight costs and increasing insurance premiums are factored into the final price, while discounts on raw materials allow these costs to be compensated.
The maritime industry is entering a period of final fragmentation. Efforts by the EU to block ports in third countries and expand the tanker lists will not immediately halt exports but claim to radically alter its economics.
We are witnessing the formation of “parallel” port infrastructures and financial frameworks that operate outside the reach of Western law.
If the 20th package is adopted in such a forceful manner, it will accelerate the aging process of the global fleet (as new vessels will avoid toxic routes) and lead to further rising logistics costs. For Russian exports, this means an inevitable increase in transport costs and a need to invest in its own port infrastructure in friendly regions.
In reality, the anniversary sanctions package risks becoming the “last Chinese warning.” The effectiveness of sanctions has become more public relations-oriented than economically driven. Behind the stern words lies neither unity within the EU nor clear mass support from voters, nor a mechanism for total control over the enforcement of sanctions. The decline of influence among once-powerful European nations leads to a reduced risk of non-compliance with the rules they impose. As experience shows from America, to demand something, you must send an aircraft carrier. However, there are no gunboats for all dissenters.
Source: Vgudok
