The European Commission (EC) announced the 21st sanctions package against Russia, with an official statement published on the organization's website. The restrictions will affect Russian banks, the defense industry, and will also impose a ban on entry to the EU for Russian military personnel.
The EC has also announced new sanctions against the Russian shadow fleet: an additional 30 vessels will be added to the EU sanction list of 632 vessels, although their names remain undisclosed.
For the first time, restrictions will be enacted against vessels providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services. Restrictions may also be imposed on ports and airports through which Russian oil is sold, as well as oil refineries that utilize raw materials from Russia. Finally, the sale of LNG tankers to Russia will be limited.
Restrictions on LNG Carriers
European countries have never sold tankers for the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Russia. The export projects of NOVATEK, namely "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2", operate vessels built in South Korea. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, "Alexey Kosygin," was built and delivered to the client by the Russian shipyard Zvezda at the end of 2025.
Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the fuel marketplace Open Oil Market, reminded that most tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by South Korea's Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "It seems that the EU is attempting to retroactively close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation. However, it would be difficult to exploit such a loophole, given the overall sanctions backdrop," he stated.
The Center for Price Indices (CPI) noted that the EU lacks shipyards for building tankers but does have ship repair facilities for servicing them, particularly in Denmark. "It is possible that the sanctions will specifically include the servicing and repair of Russian LNG tankers," they speculated. The CPI believes that the new measures are aimed at applying pressure to all consumers of Russian oil, including major buyers such as China, India, and Turkey.
Managing Partner of Kasatkin Consulting, Dmitry Kasatkin, stated that the main risks associated with LNG are more related to the services for the existing fleet rather than direct supplies of new vessels from Europe—such as maintenance, insurance, and vessel servicing. "For existing LNG projects, there will be no effect unless the sanctions target existing long-term contracts and vessel servicing. This measure could be more sensitive for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialized ice-class LNG tankers are difficult to replace. They represent an expensive, scarce, and technologically complex fleet. However, again, this is likely to complicate supply chains rather than eliminate the possibility of acquiring an LNG carrier," he believes.
Konstantin Pozdnyakov, advisor to the rector of RGSU, PhD in economics, mentioned that the restrictions on the supply of LNG tankers include a ban on technical maintenance for Russian vessels designed for transporting liquefied gas. Starting January 2027, it will become illegal to provide terminal services for Russian LNG, which will create challenges for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He believes that companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet—primarily bunkering vessels for refueling ships at sea, as well as technical support vessel operators and insurance companies—will be most vulnerable. For shipowners, this represents a significant increase in compliance risks, as even a single instance of providing services to a shadow fleet tanker could lead to inclusion in sanctions lists and loss of access to European ports and financial services, the expert noted.
The Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports
Kasatkin believes that the impact on Russian servicing vessels working with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, this means increased risks, higher insurance costs, challenges with chartering, repair, and port entry. However, the established logistics are not critically affected: chains can be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points.
Tereshkin asserts that sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet could theoretically complicate the logistics of oil exports temporarily. However, it will not have a long-term effect—due to regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of some tankers following a sharp easing of sanctions against Venezuela.
Commenting on possible sanctions against foreign maritime ports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and oil products predominantly export through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructure: ports in Western India, oil terminals in China's Shandong province and on the East Coast, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as certain transshipment and blending hubs in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov indicated that the main recipients of Russian oil in 2024-2026, following the European embargo, will be India and China. "The key unloading ports will be India's Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals serving independent refineries," the expert explained.
Sanctions against ports and refineries dealing with Russian raw materials may theoretically affect major Indian and Turkish enterprises, but the European Union does not possess direct leverage over the infrastructure of third countries,” noted Pozdnyakov. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such entities, but are unlikely to lead to supply stoppages," added Kasatkin. "These measures do not directly target the end consumer of Russian oil; the further the sanctions limitation is from the end consumer, the less transparent the chain becomes and the easier it is to restructure." The impact on airports is likely to be nonexistent, he emphasized. "A separate question is how these restrictions will be enforced and monitored; we anticipate that the EU will find Asian markets opaque and sanction enforcement will be quite formal," Kasatkin stated.
Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions could be sensitive for Turkish refineries using Russian oil to produce oil products for further supply to Europe. "The European Union has already imposed restrictions on the import of oil products produced using Russian oil. However, tracking such a ban is quite challenging, hence the introduction of new restrictions that will raise risks for refineries working with Russian raw materials," he explained.
"Indian and Turkish refineries will face a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to purchase discounted Russian raw materials," Pozdnyakov clarifies. "Many may prefer to redirect export flows to the growing Asian market. The long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom." According to him, the new sanctions will mean further increases in logistics costs and the need to develop marine transportation infrastructure without European contractors for Russian exports.
Source: RBC
