Current Global News in the Oil, Gas, and Energy Sector as of February 12, 2026: Brent and WTI Crude, Natural Gas, LNG, Refineries, Electricity, Renewable Energy, Coal, and Key Events in the Global Energy Market for Investors and Companies.
The global fuel and energy complex is entering mid-February 2026 in a state of fragile balance amid contradictory signals. Potential dialogue between Washington and Tehran regarding the nuclear program has somewhat eased geopolitical tensions and supported calmer oil prices; however, concerns over market saturation remain. The European gas market is experiencing notable volatility due to low storage levels and weather factors, although active LNG imports and diversification of sources are currently averting a crisis. Simultaneously, the energy transition is gaining momentum: renewable energy is breaking records in capacity addition, while global coal demand is at historic highs. Below is a detailed overview of key news and trends in the oil, gas, and energy sectors as of this date.
Global Oil Market: Supply Surplus and Relative Price Stability
The oil market commenced 2026 showing signs of significant oversupply. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), a surplus of oil up to 4 million barrels per day (about 4% of global demand) is expected in the first quarter. Aggregate production is growing faster than consumption: OPEC+ countries increased their quotas in the second half of 2025 while the US, Brazil, Guyana, and other producers also raised exports. This may lead to a rise in global inventories and exert downward pressure on prices.
Nonetheless, oil prices are currently maintained at moderate levels. Since the start of the year, Brent prices have risen by approximately 5%, partially buoyed by geopolitical expectations, and are now trading in the $60–65 per barrel range (WTI around $55–60). These levels are close to the end of 2025. Several risk factors are preventing a more pronounced decline in prices, creating a "geopolitical premium":
- Venezuela: At the beginning of January, the US initiated the removal of President Nicolás Maduro from power, urging oil companies to invest in this country’s production. This triggered temporary disruptions in Venezuelan oil exports (January supplies fell by about 0.5 million barrels per day), supporting prices for heavy crude.
- Iran: Prior to the recent announcement of negotiations, fears of military strikes on Iran's oil infrastructure persisted. Although the willingness of the US and Iran to engage in dialogue (talks were held on February 6 in Oman) has somewhat eased tensions, the situation surrounding Iran remains a factor of uncertainty, and traders are pricing in a premium in case of diplomatic failures or escalation in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Production disruptions: Kazakhstan experienced unplanned production cuts early in the year due to technical issues and drone attacks on its fields. While the volume of losses is small, such incidents serve as a reminder of supply fragility and add caution to the market.
To maintain balance, exporters adhere to a cautious strategy. The OPEC+ cartel and its allies (including Russia) have decided to pause output increases after a series of hikes: current production quotas will remain unchanged until at least the end of March 2026. Major producers aim to avoid market saturation, noting that fundamental indicators remain relatively healthy while commercial oil inventories are at moderate levels. OPEC+ states its readiness to promptly adjust production in response to market changes: increasing supplies (by returning previously cut volumes of 1.65 million barrels per day) or again cutting back if necessary. Demand for oil is growing slowly: the forecast for global consumption growth in 2026 is about +0.9–1.0 million barrels per day, thanks to economic normalization and prices lower than a year ago. Overall, the oil market is entering the year in a state of fragile equilibrium: the expected supply surplus is mitigated by OPEC+'s cautious policy and disruption risks, keeping prices within a relatively narrow range.
Natural Gas Market: European Volatility Amid Low Inventories
The global gas market at the start of 2026 is characterized by significant price fluctuations, particularly in Europe. The calm period of autumn — when gas exchange prices were held within a narrow range (€28–30 per MWh at the TTF hub) — has been replaced by a surge in volatility in January. In the early weeks of the new year, prices in the EU sharply increased, reaching a peak of around €37 per MWh by January 16. The reasons include a combination of weather-related and structural factors: expectations of harsh frosts at the end of January heightened demand, while gas inventories in storage were significantly below normal levels. By mid-January, European underground gas storage facilities (UGS) were filled to approximately half (~50% of total capacity compared to ~62% a year earlier and ~67% on average over the past five years as of this date). These are the lowest levels recorded in recent years (since the crisis winter of 2021/22), prompting market concerns about potential fuel shortages by winter’s end with insufficient imports.
Additional price pressure was applied from liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply disruptions from the US at the beginning of the year, caused by temporary technical issues and weather conditions at export terminals. Simultaneously, Asia's demand for LNG surged due to colder weather, intensifying competition for spot cargoes of fuel. Collectively, these factors have led traders to quickly close short positions and contributed to a rapid rise in prices. Towards the end of January, the situation stabilized somewhat: following the peak cold period, prices retreated to around €35 per MWh. Analysts note that the European gas market has once again become volatile, although panic peaks similar to those in 2022 have not yet been observed.
- Low inventories: By the end of January 2026, EU UGS facilities were filled to only about 45% of capacity — the lowest level for this time of year since 2022. If gas withdrawals continue at the current pace, by the end of winter, inventories could decrease to around 30% or lower. This means Europe will need to inject about 60 billion cubic meters of gas over the summer to achieve the targeted 90% storage level (set by the EU for energy security) by November 1.
- The role of LNG: The primary resource for inventory replenishment remains LNG imports. In 2025, Europe increased its purchases of liquefied gas by approximately 30%, reaching a record ~175 billion cubic meters, effectively compensating for the cessation of pipeline supplies from Russia. In 2026, LNG import volumes are expected to continue increasing: the IEA forecasts a ~7% rise in global LNG production, reaching new all-time highs. New export capacities are being brought online in North America (the US, Canada, Mexico), with projections for the establishment of 300 billion cubic meters of new LNG terminals worldwide by 2025–2030 (about +50% of the current market volume). This partially offsets the shortfall in Russian gas volumes.
- Abandoning Russian gas: The EU has officially set a course to completely phase out gas from Russia by 2027. By early 2026, Russia's share in European imports has already dropped to about 13% (down from 40–45% before 2022). In 2025–2026, sanctions will tighten further, leading to a reduction in gas supply in Europe by tens of billions of cubic meters. The freed-up shortfall is planned to be covered by increasing LNG supplies from the US, Qatar, African countries, and other sources. However, analysts warn of risks: Europe’s dependence on transatlantic LNG has notably increased — according to IEEFA research, around 57% of LNG imports into the EU were sourced from the US in 2025, and this share could reach 75–80% by 2030, contradicting diversification goals.
- Price anomaly: Notably, the futures curve in the gas market is currently demonstrating an atypical situation: summer contracts for 2026 are trading at higher prices than winter 2026/27 contracts. This backwardation — contrary to typical seasonal logic — could complicate the economics of gas storage — UGS operators find it unprofitable to purchase relatively expensive summer gas to sell it cheaper in winter. Possible explanations for this phenomenon include market expectations of stable year-round LNG supplies or pricing in potential regulatory interventions. Nevertheless, this price setup adds uncertainty, and market participants will closely monitor spread dynamics when planning fuel injections into storage.
Overall, the European gas market is undergoing a stress test amid minimal reserves and a reshaping of supply sources. While panic has been averted thanks to LNG inflows and mild weather periods, price volatility has returned. The upcoming spring and summer will be critical: Europe must maximize gas imports and inventory levels to confidently face the next winter without Russian volumes.
Refined Products and Refineries: Redistributing Market Flows
The refined products segment at the beginning of the year is displaying mixed trends. On one hand, global demand for refined products — particularly jet fuel and diesel — remains high due to a recovery in business activity, tourism, and freight transport. On the other hand, the supply of refined products is increasing due to higher crude processing rates in Asia and the Middle East, although trade flows are influenced by sanctions and local incidents. The first quarter traditionally marks the beginning of the scheduled maintenance season at refineries around the world: many refineries halt part of their operations for preventive maintenance. Consequently, the aggregate crude processing volume in the first quarter decreases somewhat, temporarily reducing demand for crude and exacerbating the oversupply of oil in the market. According to the IEA, widespread refinery maintenance this winter could significantly increase the oil surplus — without additional production restrictions, oil and refined product inventories are inevitably built up at the beginning of the year.
Meanwhile, refining margins remain relatively high, especially for refineries focused on diesel production. By the end of 2025, global refining capacities were operating at record levels. For instance, crude processing in China reached an all-time high of about 14.8 million barrels per day on average in 2025 (an increase of +600,000 barrels per day compared to 2024), facilitated by the commissioning of new refineries and Beijing’s effort to boost refined product exports. South Korea also set a record for diesel exports in 2025 — Asian refiners have partially filled the niche left by the redistribution of flows from Russia. Persistently high demand for diesel (in the transport and industrial sectors) supports elevated prices for distillates and provides major refineries with strong profits. Conversely, the gasoline market is witnessing some weakness: an excess of capacity and a slowdown in the growth of vehicle traffic have led to a decline in gasoline margins in Asia and Europe to the lowest levels in the past year. However, the approaching summer travel season may revive demand for gasoline and improve margin conditions in this segment.
Changes in the geography of refined product trade under pressure from sanctions also merit attention. At the end of 2025, the United States expanded sanctions against the Russian oil and gas sector, including major Russian oil companies (“Rosneft”, “Lukoil,” etc.) in the sanctions list. This complicated transactions involving their processed products in the global market. As a result, in early 2026, there has been a slowdown in the export of Russian heavy refined products (e.g., fuel oil) to Asia. Increased scrutiny of compliance with the sanctions regime and fears of secondary sanctions led many Asian buyers to avoid direct purchases of Russian products. According to industry traders, Russian fuel oil shipments to Asian countries in January fell for the third consecutive month, amounting to about half the level of a year ago (around 1.2 million tons compared to 2.5 million tons in January 2025). Some unshipped volumes are accumulating in tanks and floating storage, waiting for reselling, while some tankers are taking longer routes (e.g., around Africa) and not disclosing the final destination of the cargo. Trade schemes have become more complex: multi-tiered chains of intermediaries are often used with fuel transshipment in neutral waters to mask Russian origin.
Aside from sanction-related constraints, reductions in Russian refined product exports are also influenced by military factors. In fall 2025, drone strikes against border Russian refineries increased, damaging numerous facilities and decreasing gasoline and diesel production in Russia. Consequently, the supply of Russian fuel oils and other heavy products in the Asian market decreased by early 2026, which even provided local price support for these fuel types in Asia. Nevertheless, key markets for Moscow remain Southeast Asia, China, and the Middle East — these destinations continue to receive the bulk of volumes as Western sanctions still bar Russian refined products from traditional markets in Europe and North America.
On a global scale, the refined products market is gradually adapting to a new geography. A lion's share of the growth in global refining capacities over the coming years will occur in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Africa — this is where 80–90% of new refineries are being constructed. This intensifies competition for fuel market share among refiners. Conversely, European refiners are cutting production due to high energy prices and the disappearance of cheap Russian crude. The EU has completely banned the import of Russian gasoline, diesel, and other products since February 5, 2023, forcing European refineries to redirect to other grades of crude, which has accompanied rising costs. By the end of winter 2026, prices for major refined product types remain relatively stable: diesel fuel is holding high due to limited global supply, while gasoline and fuel oil show moderate dynamics. The exit of refiners from maintenance in spring may increase product supply, though much will depend on seasonal demand and the state of the global economy in the second half of the year.
Coal: Record Demand and Regional Discrepancies
Despite all efforts for decarbonization, coal retained a key role in the global energy mix in 2025, with global demand reaching an all-time high. According to the IEA, coal consumption worldwide in 2025 totaled approximately 8.85 billion tons — an increase of 0.5% compared to the previous year. This marks the second consecutive year of record coal usage, attributed to post-pandemic economic recovery and rising electricity demand. However, analysts believe that this current peak may serve as a "plateau" ahead of a gradual decline in coal demand by the decade's end.
The dynamics of coal use vary significantly by region:
- Europe: EU countries are rapidly phasing out coal to meet climate targets. A landmark event occurred on February 1, 2026, when the Czech Republic entirely halted coal mining, closing its last mine after 250 years of operation. Poland now remains the only country in Europe with active coal mining. EU power plants are transitioning to gas and renewables, and coal mines are closing due to economic unfeasibility and depletion. The Czech Republic took this step as its energy sector is no longer dependent on coal, while the cost of mining exceeded market prices by more than twice.
- China: The world's largest consumer and producer of coal. In 2025, China’s coal production set records, reaching ~4.83 billion tons. More than half of the country’s electricity generation still comes from coal-fired power plants. To avoid power shortages, while simultaneously developing renewables, Beijing continues to construct new high-efficiency coal power plants — at least until 2027.
- India: The second-largest coal market combines climate initiatives with rising coal consumption. The government is investing in solar and wind energy, while also encouraging mining: 32 previously inactive mines have been reopened, enabling output growth. The aim is to approach a production level of ~1.5 billion tons annually and, in the future, even export surplus coal. For now, coal helps India reduce energy imports and ensures stable operation of its power grids.
- Japan: About 30% of electricity generation in 2026 is provided by coal. Despite plans to reduce emissions, authorities consider coal-fired stations necessary for the reliability of the energy system — as a reserve for potential generation disruptions from solar and wind, as well as to reduce dependence on expensive imported gas. Coal is enshrined as a strategic reserve in the country’s energy strategy, although new renewable and nuclear capacities will gradually reduce its share.
- USA: After a prolonged trend of decreasing coal's role in energy, the US saw an unexpected rise in consumption by approximately 8% in 2025. This can be attributed to high natural gas prices and increased electricity demand (e.g., from new data centers and energy-intensive industries), which temporarily made coal generation more competitive. The US administration even paused the decommissioning of several outdated coal power plants, and coal production received a boost as part of efforts to enhance energy independence.
Thus, coal's role in the global energy balance is now determined by regional characteristics. European economies are actively pushing coal out of their fuel mix for ecological reasons, whereas many Asian countries and others still rely on coal for their energy security and to control tariffs. The transition to clean energy is uneven: regions rich in renewable potential and capital are investing in "green" technologies, while states with rapidly growing demand and limited resources continue to operate coal facilities to ensure a stable electricity supply. Global coal consumption is expected to stabilize and begin a gradual decline as new renewables and nuclear power plants come online, but in the short term, coal remains a sought-after fossil fuel.
Electricity and Renewable Sources: A “Green Leap”
The global electricity sector is entering a new phase of rapid development of renewable technologies. According to the IEA report “Electricity 2026,” the structure of global generation will change radically within this decade. By 2025, the volume of electricity produced from renewable sources (solar, wind, etc.) equaled that generated by coal-fired power plants. Starting in 2026, clean energy sources are projected to outpace coal generation. It is expected that by 2030, the combined share of renewable and nuclear energy will reach 50% of global electricity production.
This rapid growth is driven primarily by solar and wind power plants. New capacities are being added annually: over 600 TWh of solar photovoltaic generation alone is added each year. When accounting for wind, total growth in renewable generation by 2030 is estimated to be about 1000 TWh per year (which represents +8% annually against the current level). However, electricity demand is also rising quickly. Between 2024 and 2030, global electricity consumption is expected to increase by 3–4% per year — approximately 2.5 times faster than overall energy demand growth. The reasons include industrialization in developing countries, widespread adoption of electric transport (electric cars, electric buses), and the digitalization of the economy (growth in data center networks, increased use of air conditioning and household electronics). As a result, even the rapid growth of renewables does not instantaneously displace fossil fuel generation: gas-fired power generation is being ramped up to balance systems. Many see natural gas as a "transition fuel," and gas generation is expected to increase at least until 2030 — although at a slower pace than renewables.
The swift rise of renewable energy is posing new challenges for infrastructure. Existing power grids and energy storage capacities require significant upgrades to integrate intermittent sources (solar and wind). The IEA emphasizes that to meet growing demand and ensure system reliability, annual investments in electrical networks must increase by 50% by 2030 compared to the average level of the past decade. Progress is also essential in energy storage and load management technologies, to smooth out peaks and troughs of renewable generation. Many countries are already investing in industrial batteries and “smart grids”: for example, the surplus solar and wind energy in China is planned to be directed towards the production of “green” hydrogen, which can then be used as an energy carrier or a raw material in industry. Such projects, along with the development of new types of batteries (including sodium-ion, reducing dependency on lithium), and hydrogen technologies are attracting attention from investors worldwide.
Energy policies show regional disparities. In the European Union, the course towards "green" energy remains a priority. Despite the energy crisis of 2022, the EU has not abandoned its climate plans; rather, it has accelerated the deployment of renewables. By the end of 2025, the production of electricity from wind and solar installations in the EU exceeded that generated from fossil fuels for the first time. European governments are setting even more ambitious goals: nine countries (Germany, France, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, etc.) have agreed to large-scale cooperation in the North Sea to develop offshore wind energy. The goal is to achieve a set capacity of 300 GW from offshore wind farms by 2050 (compared to ~30 GW today). By 2030, no less than 100 GW of offshore wind is planned through cross-border projects. This significant expansion of renewables is expected to provide stable and affordable energy supply, create thousands of jobs, and reduce dependence on fossil fuel imports.
However, the EU's green agenda faces challenges. The rise in interest rates and the cost of materials in 2024–2025 led to certain tenders for wind farm construction attracting no bids — investors found the proposed conditions unprofitable. In Germany and the UK, several offshore wind auctions ended with no successful bidders. EU regulators acknowledge the issue and are preparing supportive measures: additional guarantees, direct subsidies, and contracts for difference (CfDs) are being discussed to enhance the attractiveness of renewable projects for businesses.
In contrast, the US has undergone a partial rollback of government support for clean energy following a change in administration in 2025. President Donald Trump's administration is skeptical of several green initiatives. Trump publicly criticized the European emphasis on renewables, calling wind turbines “unprofitable” and asserting that “the more windmills, the more the country loses money.” Accordingly, US authorities have aimed to support traditional energy sources. In addition to measures to revive the coal industry, wind generation projects are also under close scrutiny. In December 2025, the US Department of the Interior unexpectedly suspended several major offshore wind projects, citing new data on potential threats (including supposed interference with military radars). This decision affected even the nearly-completed Vineyard Wind project off the coast of Massachusetts. Major investors — companies like Avangrid/Iberdrola, Ørsted, and others — have challenged the moratorium in court. By January 2026, they achieved initial victories: a federal judge suspended the order, allowing Vineyard Wind to be completed (the object was over 95% ready). Legal disputes are ongoing, and the industry hopes to avoid significant delays. Nevertheless, the resulting uncertainty dampens investor interest in American renewable energy projects, while Europe demonstrates determination to move forward and is ready to increase support for the sector.
Renewable energy encompasses more than just sun and wind. Many countries are ramping up investments in energy storage infrastructure (industrial batteries), expanding the use of hydropower and geothermal sources. Concurrently, there is a resurgence of interest in nuclear energy as a low-carbon stable source: private companies and funds are investing in the development of small modular reactors (SMRs). For instance, the Italian startup Newcleo secured €75 million in February 2026 for the development of compact reactors powered by recycled nuclear fuel. Since 2021, Newcleo has raised a total of €645 million in funding and plans to accelerate the construction of a demonstration reactor while entering the US market — one of the most dynamic regions for advanced nuclear technologies. Such initiatives indicate that the nuclear sector may play a significant role in the decarbonization of the economy alongside renewables.
The impacts of the energy transition are already being felt in markets. In Europe, wholesale electricity prices significantly decreased by the end of 2025 compared to autumn, aided by mild weather, seasonal demand drops, and high renewable generation (thanks to windy and warm conditions). However, reliability issues persist: for instance, Ukraine's energy system remains in dire condition due to ongoing strikes on its infrastructure, causing power outages during winter. On a global scale, the trend is clear: more than half of all new generating capacities currently being deployed worldwide stem from solar and wind stations. This inspires confidence that, although fossil fuels will remain part of the energy balance for a long time, the energy transition has taken on an irreversible character — global energy is confidently moving towards a cleaner and more sustainable model.
Geopolitics and Sanctions: Hopes and Reality
Political factors continue to exert substantial influence on global energy resource markets. The sanctions confrontation between the West and key suppliers — Russia, Iran, and Venezuela — persists, but market participants are seeking signs of potential détente. Some positive signals have indeed emerged at the beginning of 2026. Venezuela has undergone a political regime shift: the ousting of Nicolás Maduro opens the way for the normalization of the Venezuelan oil sector. Investors hope that with new leadership, the US will gradually ease sanctions, allowing significant volumes of Venezuelan oil to return to the global market (as the resources of this country are among the largest in the world). In the long term, this could potentially increase the supply of heavy oil and stabilize prices for crude and refined products. In the meantime, the short-term effect is ambiguous: January's turbulence led to a reduction in Venezuela's exports by approximately 500,000 barrels per day, impacting Asian refineries that process this oil.
The situation around Iran remains tense. Although Tehran has agreed to negotiate with Washington, and initial contacts have taken place in Oman, no significant breakthroughs have been achieved yet. The rhetoric from both sides remains hardline, and rumors of possible strikes by the US or Israel on Iranian nuclear sites continue to unsettle markets. Iran is a key oil producer in OPEC, so any military actions could incapacitate export terminals or dissuade shipping companies from operating in the Persian Gulf. Despite the lack of direct conflict, the risk of escalation is being priced into the markets in the form of an insurance premium for potential force majeure in the Strait of Hormuz.
Meanwhile, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has now entered its fourth year and continues to impact the energy sector. The European Union has virtually ceased purchasing Russian energy resources, restructuring logistics to alternative suppliers. Russia, in turn, has redirected its oil and gas exports to Asian markets and other loyal countries. However, new challenges are mounting in the Russian energy sector. As noted earlier, the tightening of US sanctions at the end of 2025 complicated even transactions with traditional Asian buyers: many of them have opted to wait or are demanding larger discounts from Moscow due to the risks associated with cooperation. Moreover, drone attacks on Russian infrastructure have increased: alongside the aforementioned strikes on refineries, diversions are being recorded at oil depots and pipeline sections. According to industry monitoring, oil production in Russia began to see a slight decline in December 2025 and January 2026 after a recovery in the middle of the year. If, in the first half of 2025, Russia managed to return to production growth (following the downturn during 2022–2023), by early 2026 a decline was recorded for the second consecutive month. Experts attribute this to the exhaustion of "easy" pathways for redirecting flows and difficulties in servicing fields under sanctions. Russian oil exports by sea remain high in volume but require increasingly lengthy routes and a large fleet of "shadow" tankers operating circumventing official restrictions and risking falling under more stringent control in the future.
Thus, geopolitical uncertainty continues to be a significant factor of volatility. Nevertheless, cautious optimism has emerged in the markets: many importers have adapted to the new conditions, and exporters are demonstrating ingenuity in bypassing barriers. Some experts argue that the most acute phases of energy confrontation have already been passed. However, there is currently no significant progress on the diplomatic front — attempts to negotiate sanctions relief or ceasefires have yielded little result. Investors continue to closely monitor signals from Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing. Any information regarding potential new negotiations, deals, or relaxations of the sanctions regime could significantly influence market sentiment. Until then, the political factor will continue to introduce an element of uncertainty and turbulence in prices — whether due to the risk of sudden conflicts or unexpected decisions from regulators and governments.
Investments and Corporate News in the Industry
Investors in the fuel and energy sector are closely watching both the record profits of traditional oil and gas companies and the large investments in energy transition projects. Below are some key events in the corporate segment and investments:
- Record profits in oil and gas: Major oil and gas corporations closed 2025 with impressive financial results. For instance, ExxonMobil reported a net income of $28.8 billion for the year, while Saudi Aramco consistently earns $25–30 billion in quarterly profits (about $28 billion in the third quarter of 2025 alone). Such colossal revenues have enabled companies to increase shareholder returns — launching large stock buyback programs and increasing dividends — while also investing in new exploration projects. Oil and gas giants are investing in expanding production in traditional areas: from exploring shale formations in the Permian Basin (US) to deep-water fields off the Brazilian coast and gas projects in East Africa. Simultaneously, many have announced plans for investments in low-carbon sectors (renewables, hydrogen, carbon capture technologies), although the share of such "green" expenditures remains small compared to the core business.
- Deals in renewable energy: A steady influx of capital into "green" projects continues worldwide, with governments entering into substantial agreements with investors. For example, Egypt signed contracts worth $1.8 billion in January 2026 for the development of renewable energy. Plans include the construction of a 1.7 GW solar power plant with a 4 GWh energy storage system in Upper Egypt (a project by Norwegian company Scatec) and the opening of a Chinese firm's plant for manufacturing industrial batteries in the Suez Economic Zone. Aiming to increase the share of “green” generation to 42% by 2030, Egypt is securing support from international partners. Such projects indicate high investment activity in emerging economies.
- New technologies and startups: Innovative companies in the energy sector continue to attract funding. In addition to the aforementioned Italian nuclear startup Newcleo, initiatives in hydrogen and synthetic fuels are developing. For example, the Chilean-American company HIF Global is promoting the construction of a factory for "green" hydrogen and electronic fuel (methanol) in the port of Açu (Brazil) at a cost of $4 billion. Recently, it was reported that the project has been optimized to reduce capital costs: the implementation has been divided into phases, each costing < $1 billion. The first phase of the facility is expected to launch by mid-2027 and aims to produce ~220,000 tons of "electromethanol" annually from hydrogen and captured CO2. Automakers and airlines interested in this new environmentally-friendly fuel are expressing interest in the project.
- Mergers and Acquisitions: Consolidation continues in the resource sectors. In 2025, two major M&A transactions reshaped the oil and gas landscape in the US: ExxonMobil announced the acquisition of shale producer Pioneer Natural Resources, while Chevron announced the purchase of Hess Corp. This has strengthened the positions of oil giants in exploration. At the beginning of 2026, potential megadeals were being discussed in related sectors – for instance, a merger of mining giants Rio Tinto and Glencore (estimated at over $200 billion) aimed at combining coal and metallurgical assets, but the parties abandoned these plans due to antitrust risks and integration complexities. Major players are eager to scale up and achieve synergy, but regulatory barriers may limit the realization of such mega-projects.
- Investment balance: Overall, energy investments remain at high levels, with funding for the energy transition increasing. According to BloombergNEF, in 2025, global investments in clean energy (renewables, electric grids, storage, electric vehicles, etc.) matched those in the fossil sector for the first time. Banks and funds are reassessing strategies, intensifying the focus on sustainable financing. Nevertheless, oil and gas will continue to attract a significant share of capital for a long time. For investors, the key question is balancing the portfolio between traditional oil and gas (providing high short-term returns) and promising "green" directions, capable of ensuring future growth. Many adopt a dual tactic: capitalizing on record profits from current high oil/gas prices while simultaneously investing in renewables, hydrogen, and other technologies to not miss the next wave of growth.
Corporate news in the industry at the beginning of the year also includes the release of financial statements for 2025, personnel reshuffles, and technological achievements. On the wave of profits, some companies announced increased dividends and new stock buyback programs, which delighted shareholders. Simultaneously, under public pressure, oil and gas conglomerates are announcing updated emissions reduction targets and investing in climate initiatives, attempting to improve their image and prepare for operating in conditions of energy transition. Thus, the global energy business exhibits a commitment to resilience and flexibility: maximizing current profits while also laying the foundation for success in a low-carbon economy of tomorrow.
Expectations and Forecasts
As winter 2026 approaches its end, energy sector experts provide cautiously optimistic forecasts. The baseline scenario for the coming months is the preservation of relative stability in hydrocarbon prices without sharp fluctuations. Governments and companies have learned lessons from the shocks of the early 2020s and have formed response mechanisms to crises: from accumulating strategic reserves of oil and gas to coordination agreements within OPEC+ and energy efficiency improvement programs. Projections from specialized agencies suggest a gradual decrease in oil prices by year-end, if the supply surplus is realized as planned. For example, the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) expects that the average price of Brent may drop to ~$55 per barrel by the fourth quarter of 2026. However, any serious force majeure — escalation of conflict in the Middle East, hurricanes disrupting LNG facilities, or other supply disruptions — could temporarily reverse the price trend upwards.
As for the gas market, its further development largely depends on the summer season's progress. If the summer of 2026 is moderately warm, and the global LNG industry continues to accelerate exports, Europe will be able to fill storages relatively easily. In such a case, average gas prices in the EU may remain in the €25–30 per MWh range, comparable to the relatively comfortable levels at the end of 2025. However, risks remain: increased competition with Asia for additional LNG volumes, as well as weather surprises (for example, the risk of droughts reducing hydroelectric output or early cold in autumn) add uncertainty. If, by autumn, gas inventories are brought close to the targeted 90%, Europe will face the next winter much more confidently than the previous one, having a solid buffer of resilience.
