Escalation of the Conflict Between India and Pakistan: A Historical-Political Overview

The confrontation between India and Pakistan is often referred to as the “powder keg of South Asia.” Some analysts consider the Kashmir region to be the most militarized area in the world and one of the most likely flashpoints for a nuclear confrontation on the planet. Combined, both countries possess over three hundred nuclear warheads, millions-strong armies, and regularly exchange artillery fire across their border. Each new flare-up of tension immediately elicits reactions from global markets and diplomatic efforts to diffuse the situation. Since the end of the Cold War, experts believe that the India-Pakistan conflict remains the most dangerous bilateral rivalry, as, unlike the competition between the U.S. and the USSR, two nuclear powers here share a direct border and have already engaged in direct military clashes several times. Any mistake or miscalculation could lead to a catastrophe not only for them but for the entire world.

The relevance of this topic is not only due to recent events but also to the fact that any escalation between India and Pakistan carries risks far beyond South Asia. Both states possess nuclear weapons, and every confrontation between them poses the threat of uncontrolled escalation. International players, including the UN and leading world powers, are closely monitoring the situation, urging restraint from both parties. For readers interested in international politics, it is crucial to understand the historical roots of this confrontation, the current causes of tension, and the possible consequences of escalation.

This article presents a historical-political overview of the conflict between India and Pakistan. It examines the origins and evolution of their relationship from the partition of British India in 1947 to the present day, analyzes the causes of the current crisis, compares the military capabilities of the parties, and assesses the impact of the confrontation on the domestic politics of each country, as well as on regional and global security. Special attention is given to the question of who might benefit from the escalation of the conflict, discusses the prospects for resolution, and outlines possible scenarios for the development of events. This comprehensive approach will help provide a coherent understanding of why the conflict between India and Pakistan periodically escalates and what it may lead to in the near future.

History of Relations Between India and Pakistan Since 1947

1947–1949: Partition of India and the First War for Kashmir

Relations between India and Pakistan since their independence in 1947 have been extremely tense. The partition of British India along religious lines led to the creation of two states—a secular, predominantly Hindu Republic of India and an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This partition resulted in one of the largest population exchanges in history: about 14 million people were forced to move, and communal violence led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of individuals. In the early months of independence, disputes arose around the princely states that needed to decide which country to join. The question of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, a region with a predominantly Muslim population whose ruler delayed his decision, became particularly acute.

In October 1947, fearing the Maharaja of Kashmir would tilt towards India, armed tribal factions supported by Pakistan invaded his territory. The ruler of Kashmir sought assistance from Delhi and signed an accession agreement to India. Thus began the First Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948. The hostilities lasted several months and ended with a UN-mediated ceasefire. Kashmir was left divided: India established control over approximately two-thirds of the former princely state (the regions of Jammu and Kashmir in the south and Ladakh in the east), while Pakistan held the rest (known in Pakistan as “Azad Kashmir” and the Northern Areas). The Line of Control established in 1949 never became an official border, leaving the “Kashmir question” unresolved. The First War entrenched the division of Kashmir: approximately two-thirds of the territory went to India, while the remaining part went to Pakistan. Both countries suffered significant losses (the death toll ran into the thousands), and tens of thousands of Kashmiris were displaced from their homes due to the fighting. Therefore, the status of Kashmir remained unresolved, laying a time bomb beneath the relations of India and Pakistan for decades to come.

1950s – 1965: Ideological Confrontation and the Second War

In the subsequent years, there remained deep distrust between the two states. From the very first days of its existence, Pakistan felt threatened by the larger and more militarily powerful India. India, in turn, viewed Pakistan as a secessionist part of its own territory and was concerned about its claims over Kashmir. Ideological differences only exacerbated the situation: Pakistan was created as a homeland for Muslims, relying on the idea of “two nations,” while India, despite the Hindu majority, proclaimed itself a secular state, attempting to unify many ethnic and religious communities. In the 1950s, both states sought external allies: Pakistan aligned itself with the United States and joined pro-Western military alliances (CENTO, SEATO), receiving significant military aid, while India adopted a policy of non-alignment and simultaneously established a partnership with the Soviet Union. These geopolitical orientations meant that the confrontation on the subcontinent took on a global dimension, becoming part of the Cold War. In 1962, India suffered a defeat in a brief border war with China, which undermined its standing. The Pakistani leadership concluded that the Indian army was weakened, creating an opportunity to resolve the Kashmir dispute by force.

In 1965, tensions over Kashmir escalated into the Second Indo-Pakistani War. Earlier that April, the sides had already clashed in the arid region of Rann of Kutch in western India; that border conflict was diplomatically halted (with British mediation), but it fueled the confidence of the Pakistani leadership in the army's readiness. Believing that discontent had built up in Kashmir against Indian rule, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in August 1965, secretly sending infiltrators and volunteers across the Line of Control to organize an anti-Indian uprising. However, the plan failed: the local population did not support the infiltrators, and India retaliated by going on the offensive. A full-scale war ensued, covering both Kashmir and Punjab. Both sides deployed significant forces; the largest tank battles since World War II occurred. The conflict lasted several weeks and resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, but did not produce a clear victor. The international community, fearing an escalation of the conflict, insisted on a ceasefire. In January 1966, the Tashkent Declaration was signed with Soviet mediation, in which both sides agreed to withdraw troops to pre-war positions and committed to resolving disputes peacefully. However, the root cause—the dispute over Kashmir's status—remained unresolved, and both countries soon began preparing for possible new clashes. The 1965 war ended without significant territorial changes: both sides, having sustained several thousand casualties each, returned to pre-war boundaries. Nevertheless, the conflict reinforced Pakistan’s conviction in the necessity to fight for Kashmir by all means, while India learned the lesson of the importance of military superiority.

1971: The Third War and the Formation of Bangladesh

The next major conflict broke out in 1971, but its immediate cause lay not in Kashmir, but in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In the eastern province of Pakistan, populated by ethnic Bengalis, a mass conflict erupted in early 1971 between a local autonomy movement and the central authorities of Pakistan. The harsh actions of the Pakistani army against the Bengali population (Operation Searchlight) triggered a humanitarian disaster: around 10 million refugees fled to India. The Indian government, headed by Indira Gandhi, decided to intervene, supporting the movement for the independence of Bangladesh. In December 1971, India and Pakistan entered open war on two fronts—west (the India-West Pakistan border) and east (East Pakistan). Indian troops, along with the forces of Bengali rebels (Mukti Bahini), quickly achieved success in the east, surrounding the Pakistani garrison. On December 16, 1971, the Pakistani army in Dhaka surrendered, with over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers captured. This war resulted in the breakup of Pakistan—its eastern part became the independent state of Bangladesh. The fighting in the west also ceased after the defeat of Pakistani forces.

In 1972, at a summit in Shimla, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed an agreement that established a new ceasefire line in Kashmir (which became the effective border known as the Line of Control) and confirmed the intention to resolve all disputes between the two countries peacefully and bilaterally. The Shimla Agreement effectively closed the door on international mediation, postulating that the parties would seek ways to resolve the issues themselves. At the same time, India returned captured territories and most of the prisoners of war to Pakistan, hoping to stabilize the situation. Bhutto publicly promised to seek a peaceful resolution and recognition of the new line, but the final status of Kashmir was not determined de jure—each side remained at its position. Despite diplomatic arrangements, hostility between India and Pakistan did not dissipate. This war became the most significant; according to different estimates, more than 12,000 soldiers from both sides were killed in combat, not to mention the huge number of casualties among the civilian population in East Pakistan. The victory significantly strengthened the position of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in India, while for Pakistan, the defeat turned into a national tragedy and a quest for revenge.

1980s: Siachen, the Afghan War, and Nuclear Programs

After 1971, there were no more major wars between India and Pakistan, but periodic tensions and border conflicts continued. In 1984, an armed conflict erupted in the Siachen Glacier region in the high-altitude part of Kashmir. Taking advantage of the fact that the Line of Control in those glacial wastelands had not been clearly defined, Indian forces occupied key positions on Siachen (Operation Meghdoot). Pakistan attempted to dislodge the Indians, leading to intermittent armed incidents in the following years. Ultimately, India maintained control over strategic heights in this “highest battlefield in the world.” The Siachen conflict demonstrated that even without an open war, confrontations could flare up in the form of localized operations for disputed territories.

The 1980s were marked by an arms race and the establishment of both countries' nuclear programs. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (“Smiling Buddha”), demonstrating its potential to develop nuclear weapons. Pakistan, having been defeated in 1971, was determined not to fall behind and made enormous efforts to develop its nuclear arsenal, guided by Abdul Qadeer Khan. By the end of the 1980s, Pakistan was believed to have had the necessary components to create nuclear warheads. At the same time, both countries were acquiring increasingly modern conventional military equipment: India purchased primarily from the USSR (tanks, aircraft, ships), and Pakistan received military aid from the United States (especially during the Soviet-Afghan war from 1979 to 1989, when Pakistan was a key U.S. ally). During this period, Pakistan also received a colossal influx of weapons and resources, which were partly directed against the USSR in Afghanistan, but also to fuel underground movements in Punjab and Kashmir. The build-up of military power, combined with the absence of political dialogue, created preconditions for new crises. Thus, large-scale military exercises by the Indian army “Brass Tacks” near the Pakistani border in 1986-1987 caused panic in Islamabad, leading to both sides coming close to war, which was averted at the last minute through diplomatic efforts (notably, through the personal meeting of Zia and Rajiv Gandhi at a cricket match). This crisis illustrated how easily large-scale exercises could be perceived as preparations for an attack. At that time, the countries did not yet have official nuclear status, but as it would later become known, Pakistan was already close to developing the bomb. In 1990, amidst a resurgence of unrest in Indian-administered Kashmir (where, since 1989, a local Muslim armed struggle for secession, actively supported by Pakistan, had been underway), tensions escalated to such an extent that international observers expressed concerns over a potential nuclear confrontation. By that time, both countries were estimated to have already assembled nuclear devices. Only vigorous intervention by the U.S. and other powers (including the visit by Washington's special envoy Robert Gates) prevented a major war at that time. Allegedly, during this crisis, Pakistan even placed its nuclear forces on heightened alert to deter India from a full-scale strike – the first alarming warning of nuclear escalation in the region.

The culmination of both countries' nuclear ambitions was in 1998. In May 1998, India conducted a series of underground nuclear explosions (Operation Shakti), officially declaring itself a nuclear power. A few weeks later, Pakistan responded with its tests (Operation Chagai), demonstrating its own nuclear arsenal. The international community imposed sanctions on both nations, condemning the arms race. However, both inside India and Pakistan, these actions were met with a surge of national pride. From that moment on, any future conflicts between the two countries became potentially nuclear dangerous, leading the world to pay closer attention to events on the subcontinent.

Despite hopes that possession of nuclear weapons would cool fiery tempers (the doctrine of mutually assured destruction), in the following year, India and Pakistan found themselves embroiled in yet another military clash—the Kargil conflict of 1999. Just before this, in February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a symbolic "bus trip" to Lahore, where he met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and signed a declaration of peace and friendship. However, in the spring of the same year, taking advantage of the fact that Indian units were withdrawing from high-altitude positions in the Kargil area during winter months, Pakistani forces infiltrated across the Line of Control disguised as “jihadi rebels” and occupied several strategic heights on Indian territory. When the invasion was discovered, India mobilized its army to dislodge the violators. Fierce fighting ensued in the Kargil and Drass mountains. Indian forces, supported by air support, gradually pushed back the enemy. The situation threatened to escalate into a full-scale war, and international pressure on Pakistan intensified. The U.S. played a particularly active role: President Bill Clinton urged Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his forces immediately. Ultimately, by July 1999, Pakistani units retreated back across the Line of Control. The fighting in the Kargil mountains was fierce: India lost about 500 soldiers, while estimates suggest that Pakistan suffered casualties from 700 to several thousand (exact figures were not disclosed). The Kargil crisis was the first armed confrontation between nuclear powers. It brought mutual distrust between the two countries to a new low: India accused Pakistan of treachery (given that just recently the leaders of the two countries met at a summit in Lahore, proclaiming a desire for peace), while Pakistan experienced a political coup – the military, led by General Pervez Musharraf, the mastermind of the Kargil operation, later overthrew Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

2001-2002: Crisis Following the Delhi Terrorist Attack

The early 2000s were marked by another spike in tension. In December 2001, militants linked to Pakistani Islamist groups launched a brazen attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Five armed terrorists infiltrated the parliament grounds and opened fire, killing several security personnel (the sitting was not in session at the time). India accused the groups “Jaish-e-Mohammed” and “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” based in Pakistan, of orchestrating the attack, also hinting at involvement by the Pakistani intelligence services. This incident became the breaking point: India initiated its largest troop mobilization on the border with Pakistan in decades (Operation Prakram). Pakistan responded with mirror measures, mustering comparable forces. By 2002, nearly a million soldiers stood against each other along the borders, and mutual shelling increased. The world held its breath, fearing that the two nuclear powers would enter open warfare. Leaders of the U.S., Europe, and Russia actively mediated, urging restraint. By summer 2002, the crisis had been defused: both sides gradually withdrew troops from the Line of Control. Although direct confrontation was averted, dialogue between the countries remained frozen for several years. Tensions peaked in June 2002 when, following another terrorist attack (during an assault by militants on a camp for families of Indian military personnel in Jammu), India seriously considered conducting strikes. Only vigorous mediation (visits by representatives from the U.S. and other powers, as well as Pakistan’s promise to curb extremist activities) allowed tension to ease.

2004-2007: Attempt at Peace Dialogue

Some improvement in relations began to emerge only after 2003. In November 2003, India and Pakistan unexpectedly agreed to a complete ceasefire along the Line of Control in Kashmir. This agreement was generally adhered to over the following years, creating the groundwork for revitalizing the peace process. In January 2004, on the sidelines of a regional summit, a meeting occurred between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, following which a "Composite Dialogue" was launched—a series of negotiations covering the full array of bilateral issues, including Kashmir, trade, water use, and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Both governments exhibited cautious optimism. Confidence-building measures were undertaken (earlier, in July 2001, Presidents Musharraf and Vajpayee held a summit in Agra, which, however, failed to break through due to disagreements over Kashmir but laid the groundwork for subsequent dialogue). During 2004-2007, bus links were opened between divided parts of Kashmir, delegation exchanges commenced, and a “period of calm” was established in the contested Siachen Glacier region. In the mid-2000s, it seemed that long-standing controversies might ease. Rumors circulated regarding some compromise solution on Kashmir, allegedly devised at closed talks involving Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (this formula became known as “borders would not change but become permeable”). However, internal issues in Pakistan (with Musharraf’s authority becoming eroded) and rising distrust hindered the completion of these initiatives.

2008: The Mumbai Attacks and a New Breakup

The fragile dialogue faced a harsh blow from the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. A group of ten militants affiliated with the Pakistani organization “Lashkar-e-Taiba” carried out a series of attacks in the financial capital of India, killing more than 170 individuals, including foreigners. This tragedy shocked India. Evidence pointed to the preparation of the attack on Pakistani territory involving individuals associated with extremist groups there. International pressure led Pakistan to partially acknowledge that the perpetrators were Pakistani citizens, but the government of Pakistan denied any involvement of state entities. Despite the outrage within Indian society, the Indian government, led by Manmohan Singh, refrained from military retaliation, opting instead for diplomatic pressure. Nevertheless, the peace dialogue once again stalled for an extended period. The trust that had begun to be built over the previous years was shattered. From 2010 to 2013, attempts were made to resume contacts at the level of heads of state and ministers, but each escalation in tensions along the border or a terrorist attack reverted relations to mutual accusations. During these years, an enduring confrontation continued in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir between security forces and local insurgents, which India attributed to support from Pakistan.

2014–2016: A New Wave of Tension and "Surgical Strikes"

A new wave of tensions emerged after the arrival in power of Narendra Modi’s government in India in 2014, representing the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Modi took a tough stance on terrorism and made it clear that he was no longer willing to tolerate attacks from Pakistan. However, towards the end of 2015, it seemed that the ice was beginning to thaw: Prime Minister Modi made an unexpected visit to Lahore for the birthday of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – the first visit by an Indian leader to Pakistan in nearly a decade. This goodwill gesture raised some hopes. However, just weeks later, in January 2016, militants from the Pakistani group “Jaish-e-Mohammed” attacked the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot, Punjab. India accused terrorists acting from Pakistani territory; Islamabad formally condemned the attack and even sent a team of investigators to the site, but those responsible were never punished. A few months later, another high-profile attack occurred: in September 2016, militants attacked an Indian base in Uri (Kashmir), killing 19 soldiers. In response, Indian special forces conducted so-called “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control, claiming to have destroyed several militant camps on Pakistani territory. Pakistan denied the very existence of such raids, but India's public demonstration of readiness for military action marked a turning point.

2019: The Pulwama Attack and Threat of War

An even more dangerous situation unfolded in February 2019. On February 14, 2019, a suicide bomber from the “Jaish-e-Mohammed” group rammed an explosive-laden vehicle into a convoy of Indian security forces, resulting in the death of 40 individuals (the “Pulwama attack”). India accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and promised a decisive response. Nearly two weeks later, on February 26, 2019, the Indian Air Force carried out strikes against a target on Pakistani territory (in the Balakot area of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), claiming to have destroyed the camp of the aforementioned group. This was the first time since 1971 that Indian forces conducted airstrikes on actual Pakistani territory. The next day, Pakistan responded by sending its aircraft to the Indian border; in the ensuing aerial combat, Pakistani forces shot down an Indian MiG-21 fighter, whose pilot was captured. Notably, this was the first instance of one nuclear power conducting an airstrike on another’s territory. An immediate threat of further escalation emerged, yet, wishing to de-escalate the situation, Pakistan soon released the captured pilot. This somewhat eased the tension. With international mediation, both sides refrained from continuing hostilities. However, the world once again found itself on the brink of war between India and Pakistan.

In the same year, significant changes occurred in Indian domestic politics that profoundly affected relations with Pakistan. In August 2019, the Indian parliament, at the initiative of the Modi government, revoked the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (as per Article 370 of the Indian Constitution) and divided it into two union territories directly governed by New Delhi. This meant the complete integration of Indian-administered Kashmir and the dismantling of its previous substantial autonomy. For the residents of Kashmir, these measures were accompanied by strict restrictions: a curfew was imposed, communication was blocked for months, and thousands of additional troops were deployed to the region to quell potential unrest. Pakistan sharply condemned this step, claiming that India unilaterally altered the status of the disputed territory and thereby buried hopes for dialogue. Islamabad expelled the Indian ambassador, downgraded diplomatic relations, suspended bilateral trade, and intensified efforts on the international arena to draw attention to the Kashmir issue. India, for its part, asserted that the Kashmir issue was its internal affair, and its strict policy was driven by a necessity to combat terrorism and separatism. Since the end of 2019, no direct official negotiations between India and Pakistan have taken place. The Line of Control in Kashmir has once again become a hotspot for frequent crossfire, although in February 2021, the parties unexpectedly reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire agreement (reviving the 2003 agreement). This somewhat reduced the intensity of border incidents, but political contacts remained frozen.

Thus, the history of relations between India and Pakistan consists of a succession of wars, military crises, and periodic attempts at dialogue. The key sticking point over these decades remains the fate of Kashmir, along with mutual accusations of hostile actions. Each new flare-up of tension relies on deep historical grievances and distrust shaped by past events. Understanding this historical context is crucial to comprehend the current escalation of the conflict: it did not arise in a vacuum, but rather is the continuation of a long chain of confrontation that began in the mid-20th century.

Causes of the Current Escalation

The territorial factor (the Kashmir issue). The main and most obvious reason for the escalation is the unresolved territorial dispute over Kashmir. It is precisely over Kashmir that India and Pakistan have fought several wars in the past, and this problem continues to fuel mutual hostility. As of the early 2020s, the situation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (now a union territory) remains extremely tense. For Pakistan, Kashmir is an "unfinished partition," a matter of principle (the Muslim majority should live in a Muslim state). For India, holding onto Kashmir is a matter of secularism and territorial integrity (proof that a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state can encompass a region with a Muslim majority). The revocation of Kashmir's special status by India in 2019 and subsequent measures (strict control from Delhi, changes in demographic and administrative policies) have heightened discontent among some local populations. Armed groups with separatist and Islamist inclinations continue to operate in the region, some of which have refuge or support on Pakistani territory. Pakistan officially declares moral and diplomatic support for the "Kashmiri people's struggle for self-determination" and condemns India's actions as "occupation." India insists that Pakistan promotes and supplies terrorists destabilizing Kashmir. Legal disagreements also exist: Delhi leans on the accession document from 1947, considering it the only legitimate basis, while Islamabad appeals to the UN resolutions from 1948, demanding a referendum in Kashmir (which never took place). Accordingly, each side declares the other to be a violator of international obligations. Thus, the ground for violent outbreaks is perpetually present. The April 2025 terrorist attack by militants in the tourist region of Kashmir became the immediate trigger for the current crisis, but the roots of this violence extend into the long-standing confrontation over control of Kashmir. Each time a high-profile incident occurs in Kashmir, accusations between the nations flare up with renewed vigor, leading to escalation. Besides Kashmir itself, there are other territorial disputes between India and Pakistan—albeit less significant. One such dispute concerns the division of water resources: all major rivers in the region flow from India to Pakistan, and in 1960, the parties signed the Indus Waters Treaty. This document was long considered inviolable, but amid the current crisis, India threatened to suspend its involvement in the treaty, which would severely harm Pakistan's agriculture and water supply. Another dispute involves the delineation of marshy areas of Sir Creek in the delta of the Indus River to the south. Although Sir Creek and the waters of the Indus River do not elicit similar emotional responses from the masses, these issues also add to tensions and can be used as leverage during periods of escalation.

Religious and ideological contradictions. Historical grievances related to the religious partition of India continue to poison the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan emerged as a state for the Muslims of South Asia, and its national ideology is founded on opposition to India, perceived as a threat to the Muslim community of the subcontinent (especially for the Muslims of Kashmir). Conversely, in the Indian public consciousness, Pakistan is often associated with extremism and the terrorist threat looming over Indian statehood. The religious factor serves as a stark marker of the conflict: radical elements in Pakistan appeal to jihad against "Hindus," while Indian nationalist circles exploit the image of Pakistan as the "Islamic enemy." Although officially governments claim to be fighting not against religion but against terrorism and extremism, the rhetoric on both sides is often tinged with confessional motives. The memory of the bloody events of 1947 (when both Muslims and Hindus perished during the partition) remains alive and fuels enemy imagery. For instance, there is a widespread belief in Pakistan that Muslims in India are oppressed, reinforced by reports of communal violence (e.g., the 2002 riots in Gujarat or incidents of desecration of mosques). In India, terrorist acts perpetrated by Islamists and radical statements by Pakistani leaders contribute to shaping the view of Pakistan as a bastion of religious extremism. Accusations directed at Pakistan regarding its support for radical Islamists resonate with the domestic discourse of the Indian government, which frames it as a defense against the "jihadist threat." In Pakistan, events in Kashmir are portrayed as the struggle of Muslims for their rights against the “Hindu regime.” Thus, religious contradictions exacerbate the emotional dimension of the conflict, making rational dialogue and compromise challenging. This ideological rift has been particularly evident recently: Indian leadership, relying on the ideology of Hindutva (the supremacy of Hindu culture), conducts a policy perceived in Pakistan as discrimination against Muslims (the citizenship law of 2019, which simplifies citizenship acquisition for non-Muslim migrants from neighboring countries but does not extend to Muslims, serves as an example). In Pakistan, the influence of religious parties and organizations demanding an uncompromising stance towards the “Hindu regime” is growing. Both sides accuse each other of religious extremism, further deepening the chasm between them.

Political and ideological divergences. In addition to religious issues, there are broader political disagreements between the two countries. India positions itself as a secular democratic republic, while Pakistan, for a significant part of its history, has been under military regimes and professes Islamic values as the foundation of its political structure. These differences have engendered a mismatch in their foreign policy courses and alliances: India has traditionally sought leadership among non-aligned movements, whereas Pakistan has sought protection from powerful allies (initially the U.S., then China) to counterbalance India. As a result, trust between the ruling elites of the two countries is practically nonexistent—they belong to different “worlds.” Each side tends to see the actions of the other as having a hidden malicious intent. Any initiative from India regarding Kashmir is perceived by Pakistan as an attempt to finally usurp the disputed region. Conversely, India views Pakistan’s international activism regarding the Kashmir issue as hostile propaganda and interference in internal affairs. Moreover, both countries accuse one another of covert interference in their domestic affairs. Islamabad frequently alleges that Indian intelligence supports separatists in Balochistan and tribal regions of Pakistan; New Delhi points to Pakistan's longstanding support of Sikh militants in Punjab and Islamist terrorists in Kashmir. These accusations mutually amplify suspicion. Ideologically, India (especially under the current nationalist government) appeals to the image of a unified strong state, intolerant of external dictates, while Pakistan appeals to its role as a bastion of the Islamic world and defender of oppressed Muslims. These narratives do not gel well together, leading to a hardline stance in negotiations: neither side wishes to appear weak or conciliatory to its populace. Consequently, the political positions of Delhi and Islamabad make them less inclined to compromise, contributing to the protracted nature of the conflict. Officials on both sides regularly exchange harsh statements: Delhi labels Pakistan as a “bulwark of world terrorism,” accusing Pakistani intelligence of orchestrating attacks, while Islamabad accuses India of having “imperialist tendencies” and oppressing Muslims. Such rhetoric makes retreating from hardline stances nearly impossible without losing face, maintaining a vicious cycle of hostility.

Internal instability and its export. The internal political situation within each country plays a significant role in escalation. In Pakistan, recent years have been characterized by political instability and economic crisis. In 2022-2023, the country teetered on the edge of default; public discontent grew, and clashes occurred among supporters of differing political factions. Changes in governments and the conflict between civilian leaders and the military have weakened central authority. In such conditions, public attention can be easily diverted to an external enemy. For the Pakistani leadership, escalating a conflict with India may sometimes serve as a way to distract the population from domestic woes and unify it around the authorities in the face of an external threat. In addition, weakening state authority gives radical groups more operational freedom. When the government and the army are preoccupied with internal disputes or fighting economic collapse, extremists can activate and carry out provocative attacks against India, hoping to ignite a larger war or at least enhance their status as “defenders of faith.” The current terrorist attack in Kashmir can partly be viewed through this lens: an obscure group might have exploited the chaos to strike, knowing that the repercussions would resonate widely.

In Indian domestic politics, there are also factors influencing the perception of Pakistan. Although India is a more stable democracy, it has its acute problems: intercommunal tension between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority, separatist sentiments in some regions, and socio-economic inequality. Nationalist leadership in Delhi often employs tough rhetoric against Pakistan to bolster patriotic sentiment and divert attention from internal disagreements. For instance, following the 2019 attack, actions against Pakistan boosted the government's popularity. A sense of “national uplift” was palpable, aiding Modi's party (BJP) in securing a firm electoral victory. In general, a hard stance toward Pakistan has long been integral to the BJP's image and Modi's personal brand. Conversely, opponents are often accused of being too lenient or compromising: past governments of the Indian National Congress were criticized by nationalists for attempts at dialogue, often interpreted as weakness in the face of terrorism.

The conflict with Pakistan also plays a role in justifying internal security measures in India. The fight against extremism, declared to be “exported from Pakistan,” serves as a rationale for harsh actions against separatists and terrorists within the country. This is particularly noticeable in Kashmir, where a special security regime and substantial military presence persist. Indian authorities cite the constant threat from Pakistan to explain the prolonged deployment of the army in the region and restrictions on civil liberties in the name of preventing terrorist attacks. More broadly, the image of Pakistan as an enemy unites Indian society and distracts attention from internal problems—be it interreligious tensions, economic difficulties, or regional uprisings. When political leadership needs to bolster support, rhetoric directed at Pakistan intensifies. During internal crises (such as mass protests), official statements may focus on the “external threat,” shifting public discourse to national security. Thus, in the Indian political landscape, the long-standing confrontation with Pakistan has become a factor that the authorities know how to leverage for societal consolidation and enhancing their authority. Opposition parties are also forced to display toughness: any calls for concessions or negotiations can be easily branded as weakness. Indian media and the film industry boost this tone, extolling military prowess and heroism in the face of a “treacherous neighbor,” instilling a belief in societal readiness for confrontation.

For Pakistan, the conflict with India, and especially the struggle for Kashmir, has become the cornerstone of state ideology and domestic policy. Since the country's inception, leadership has relied on the notion of an external threat from a more powerful India to justify strong central authority and high defense spending. The Pakistani army plays a vital role here. The military is the most influential institution in the country, having repeatedly seized power through coups, and effectively determines foreign policy. Persistent tension with India serves as the primary legitimization for this status quo: the army presents itself as the guarantor of security and survival against the Indian threat. In the eyes of a significant portion of the population (socialized on patriotic and Islamic values), generals are seen as the nation's custodians, and criticizing the military is tantamount to undermining national defense. Thus, the conflict contributes to the militarization of Pakistan’s political life. Each time a civilian government has attempted to soften its stance toward India, it has encountered resistance from the military establishment. For example, Prime Ministers advocating dialogue with New Delhi (Nawaz Sharif in the late 1990s and mid-2010s, Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s) have ultimately lost power partly due to military dissatisfaction with their “overly soft” positions on Kashmir.

The Kashmir issue in Pakistan has attained the status of a nationwide cause. Every year, February 5 is observed as “Kashmir Solidarity Day”; school textbooks instill the idea of unjustified separation of Kashmir, and state media consistently narrate the “suffering of fellow Muslims” under Indian oppression. In such an atmosphere, there is little space for alternative opinions: any proposals for compromise with India will be labeled as treason. Therefore, Pakistani leaders are compelled to publicly adopt an intransigent stance, even if they understand the risks of escalation. Harsh rhetoric yields political dividends, allowing leaders to divert public attention from internal issues and unify support around authorities. When Pakistan faces economic troubles, rising prices, unemployment, or political crises, the theme of an external threat from India becomes a convenient distraction. For example, under Prime Minister Imran Khan (2018-2022), sharp criticism of India over its Kashmir policies and the treatment of Muslims in India helped bolster his populist image and divert focus from economic grievances. Khan’s successors, despite differing political views, also continue this hardline stance—partly because it is in demand by society and supported by military leadership.

The prolonged conflict has led to the rise of radical groups within Pakistan, creating a vicious cycle. Islamist parties and extremist organizations exploit anti-Indian slogans to mobilize supporters and enhance their political weight. Some of them are directly involved in the confrontation, sending militants to Kashmir or carrying out terrorist attacks, and historically, the state has either secretly supported them or overlooked their actions, viewing them as a “strategic reserve” against India. However, these groups have also become a force that the authorities must contend with. They radicalize public opinion and are capable of exerting pressure on the government, demanding non-concession to India. As a result, the Pakistani leadership finds it even more challenging to exhibit flexibility—the internal opposition of religious radicals threatens any moderate steps.

Mutual enemy imagery has deeply entrenched itself in both cultures. In India, many films and books exploit the theme of confrontation with Pakistan, praising the valor of Indian soldiers and special services in fighting against “Pakistani terrorists.” In Pakistan, the school curriculum and propaganda emphasize the suffering of Muslims in India and the necessity of being ready for jihad over Kashmir. These narratives form biases in young generations from an early age. However, there are also pacifist forces: independent journalists, scholars, and artists from both countries attempt to establish dialogue and deconstruct the enemy image. They organize cultural exchanges and joint sporting events (for example, cricket matches are seen as an opportunity for “people's diplomacy”). Yet the voice of these groups often gets drowned out in the overall refrain of hostility, especially during crises. As a result, the internal demand for reconciliation remains weak compared to the demand for toughness, and politicians must contend with the latter. It should be noted that according to surveys, a significant portion of the population in both countries does not believe in the possibility of reconciliation—around 70-80% of respondents in India and Pakistan see the neighboring country more as a threat than a potential partner. Nonetheless, peace advocates continue their work, hoping for a long-term change in public sentiment.

Thus, in both countries, the conflict with the neighbor has transformed into a factor of domestic politics and public consciousness. In India, it fuels nationalism and can be employed by the authorities for consolidation and distraction from internal issues; in Pakistan, it justifies the military's special role and unites the nation around an ideology of confrontation. This means that besides objective external reasons, there are also subjective interests of elites to maintain the conflict in an active phase. The image of the enemy has become a familiar and even useful tool, making it difficult to renounce without losing part of one’s influence. As long as the internal demand for confrontation remains high, leaders in Delhi and Islamabad will continue to pursue a tough course, fearing that concession will undermine their positions domestically.

The Impact of the Conflict on Regional and Global Security

The escalation between India and Pakistan poses direct risks to the stability of South Asia and indirect threats to the entire world. Regional level: South Asia is home to nearly a quarter of the world's population, and the security of this region largely determines the overall situation in Asia. The conflict between the two largest countries in the region paralyzes efforts at regional cooperation. For example, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has effectively become dysfunctional due to the animosity between Delhi and Islamabad—recent summits have been canceled since India refuses to sit at the same table with Pakistan amid terrorist attacks. This means missed opportunities for economic integration, trade, and joint efforts against common challenges (poverty, natural disasters, climate change) in the region. Instead of cooperation, the countries of South Asia spend resources on rivalry or are forced to choose sides. As a result, regional economic integration remains one of the weakest in the world: the total direct trade between India and Pakistan is less than $1 billion a year, and the share of intranational trade barely reaches 5% of the total volume of external trade of South Asian countries (in comparison, in Southeast Asia, this figure stands at around 25%, while within the EU it exceeds 60%). In other words, a significant portion of the growth potential and prosperity of the region is blocked by the ongoing conflict.

A direct war between India and Pakistan would have devastating consequences for their closest neighbors. Hostilities on the subcontinent threaten a mass influx of refugees—the populations of border areas in Kashmir, Punjab, and Sindh, seeking to escape shelling, may look for shelter deeper within their country or in neighboring states (for example, in Afghanistan or Iran, if the conflict touches Pakistan’s western borders). Even currently, periodic shootings force the evacuation of civilians from border zones. A full-scale war would disrupt trade routes: even in peaceful times, direct communication between India and Pakistan is minimal, but conflict would affect third countries as well. For instance, land routes from India through Pakistan to Afghanistan and Central Asia would be completely blocked, impacting the Afghan economy (which relies on Pakistani ports). In the Indian Ocean, military actions could jeopardize shipping security in the Arabian Sea—a crucial area for oil transport from the Persian Gulf. In 1971, the Indian navy successfully blocked Pakistan's ports in Karachi and Chittagong; in a modern war, a similar move would lead to a surge in insurance risks for commercial vessels, a rise in freight prices, and heightened tension in the oil market.

The India-Pakistan conflict inevitably also involves the interests of other major powers in the region, which risks drawing those powers in and expanding the scale of the crisis. This particularly pertains to China—Pakistan’s neighbor and ally. In the event of a significant war, China, which has its territorial dispute with India, might take advantage of the moment to increase pressure on the Indian border (as occurred during the India-Pakistan wars in 1965 and 1971, when Beijing undertook demonstrative measures in support of Islamabad). This would lead to a simultaneous conflict for India on two fronts, making the situation even more dangerous and unpredictable. No major power will enter into direct military action on India's side, but Western nations—the U.S. and European allies—would likely exert political pressure on Pakistan (and indirectly on China) to prevent the occurrence of worse scenarios. However, if diplomatic efforts collapse, those same U.S. could face a dilemma: how to act if two of their strategic partners—India and Pakistan (neither of which Washington wants to lose, considering its role in the Islamic world)—are at war? Any favoritism toward one side risks losing influence over the other. Thus, a major war between India and Pakistan could reshape diplomatic alliances and lead to a global geopolitical shift, intensifying block opposition (for instance, a China-Pakistan tandem against a potential India-U.S.-West bloc). This would deal a significant blow to the international security system, complicating an already intricate relationship between global power centers.

The main danger that renders the conflict uniquely threatening to the entire world is the likelihood of nuclear weapons use. As noted, both countries possess significant nuclear arsenals. While neither side desires nuclear war (understanding that it would lead to mutual destruction), any acute crisis carries the risk of miscalculation or accident, which could trigger nuclear escalation. The world remembers the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as a moment when humanity nearly experienced atomic warfare. India and Pakistan have already gone through several potentially nuclear crises—in 1999, 2002, and 2019—and each time the world balanced on the brink of catastrophe. If during the heat of battle one side feels it's losing strategically, it may decide to launch a limited nuclear strike. Even if it were a "small" warhead targeting enemy forces (e.g., a tactical nuclear missile at a concentration of equipment), the psychological barrier would be crossed. The other side would certainly respond, and further escalation could become uncontrollable. The consequences of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan extend far beyond bilateral consequences. Models have shown scenarios where an exchange of even several dozen nuclear strikes on cities could result in tens of millions of immediate deaths, while the release of soot into the atmosphere could provoke global climatic anomalies (the so-called "nuclear winter"). Some forecasts suggest that a regional nuclear war could dramatically lower temperatures on the planet and reduce crop yields, causing a global food crisis. Radiological fallout would impact not only South Asia but also countries in Central Asia, the Middle East, and possibly China and Russia—depending on wind patterns. Thus, nuclear war between India and Pakistan would become an unprecedented humanitarian and ecological catastrophe on a planetary scale.

The danger of irreversible escalation increases owing to the risk of technical malfunctions or erroneous interpretations. In the armed forces of both countries, nuclear weapons and missiles are on alert, and any extraordinary situation could be perceived as an attack. For example, in March 2022, an incident occurred: a cruise missile was mistakenly launched from India, flying hundreds of kilometers and falling on Pakistani territory. No one was harmed, and Islamabad reacted with restraint, accepting the explanation of a technical failure. But imagine if the missile had struck a residential neighborhood or if Pakistan had assumed that an attack was underway—a retaliatory strike could lead to war. This case demonstrated how perilously close the two nations stand to an unintentional conflict.

Even without considering the extreme nuclear scenario, the ongoing conflict has negative repercussions for global security. Firstly, it undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime. International efforts to limit atomic arsenals confront the argument: “why can some (India and Pakistan) but not others?” Pakistan's example, having created a bomb out of fear of a stronger neighbor, may spur other nations to address security issues via nuclear proliferation. Secondly, the constant tension between India and Pakistan distracts attention and resources from other global issues. World powers are forced to expend diplomatic capital on crisis resolution in South Asia instead of focusing, for example, on combating climate change or addressing regional conflicts in other parts of the world. Thirdly, any major terrorist act or incident involving this pair of adversaries instantly affects international markets and the global economy. India today is one of the largest economies in the world, and military conflict would impact global supply chains and financial markets (investors shy away from risk, pulling capital out of the region amid the threat of war). Oil prices rise in anticipation of supply disruptions, and international trade suffers.

Finally, instability in South Asia complicates the global fight against terrorism and extremism. While India and Pakistan accuse one another, terrorist networks may take advantage of the distraction. For instance, the situation in Afghanistan serves as a reminder: in rivalry with India, Pakistani intelligence has historically supported certain groups, which ultimately has consequences for global security (including the emergence of radical movements like the “Taliban” and the harboring of “Al-Qaeda”). Should the destabilization in Pakistan intensify (for example, amid military defeat or economic collapse in the wake of war), there is a risk of losing control over parts of the territory where jihadist organizations of global reach may establish themselves. Moreover, chaos in a country with nuclear weapons poses a direct threat to international order—potentially leading to the need for external intervention to secure nuclear arsenals.

It is essential not to overlook the humanitarian costs even in a “cold” conflict: over the past decades, tens of thousands of people (predominantly residents of Kashmir) have died due to low-intensity hostilities, terrorist acts, and repression. Millions live in constant fear on both sides of the Line of Control. Enormous resources are being drained into the arms race—funds that could have been directed toward development, healthcare, and education. South Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world; direct trade between India and Pakistan is limited to a few hundred million dollars, whereas the potential is estimated to be in the tens of billions. The hostility hampers the creation of transport corridors, joint energy projects, and tourism exchanges, depriving the citizens of both countries of the benefits of peaceful coexistence. These hidden losses also undermine regional stability and prosperity.

Thus, the conflict between India and Pakistan is not a local issue, but a factor that directly impacts international security. Each escalation raises alarm globally: emergency committees convene in the capitals of leading powers, the UN issues calls for restraint, intelligence services monitor nuclear facilities. The regional rivalry between two powers has transformed into one of the potential “triggers” for a global crisis. International institutions are, unfortunately, limited in their effective measures: for example, although the UN continues to call for dialogue, India does not accept the idea of external mediation and prefers to resolve the issue bilaterally, while Pakistan, on the other hand, wants to internationalize the Kashmir issue—these divergences lead to a deadlock. As a result, maintaining the fragile status quo depends on the prudence of New Delhi and Islamabad, as well as on the unofficial efforts of their partners. Preserving peace between India and Pakistan is a vital condition for stability not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Who Might Benefit from the Escalation of the Conflict

Despite the obvious dangers of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, there are forces for whom escalation may be beneficial in one way or another. Such beneficiaries exist both within India and Pakistan and beyond their borders.

Internal political elites and radical circles. In each country, there are groups that politically profit from maintaining an atmosphere of animosity. In India, a firm line toward Pakistan brings dividends to the ruling nationalist party (BJP): rising approval ratings, unifying the electoral base, weakening the opposition's position, which can be accused of lacking patriotism. For a government facing difficulties, a small “victorious” crisis with a neighbor becomes a convenient way to bolster its prestige. Similarly, in Pakistan, military leadership and associated political forces benefit from the conflict: it justifies existing power structures (the military’s special role), ensures a flow of resources into the defense sector, and distracts the population from problems for which elites are responsible. Pakistani generals traditionally enjoy huge confidence, manage a vast network of commercial assets, and receive up to 20% of the national budget for defense needs—naturally, such a privileged role is justified by the existence of a powerful enemy. In India, the military, although under the control of civilian authorities, also has an interest in stable funding and defense industry contracts, which is easier to ensure with Pakistan perceived as a threat. Moreover, various extreme elements in society are interested in escalation. Pakistani jihadist groups and radical organizations enhance their weight when tensions with India are high, as they can position themselves as the vanguard of the “holy war” against the enemy. They find it easier to recruit supporters and secure funding while the conflict remains active. Indian radical nationalist and extremist circles also welcome escalation, as it reinforces their narratives about an “implacable enemy” and allows them to demand harsher measures against both external adversaries and internal “sympathizers.” While these forces may not always be able to initiate a major escalation directly, they can push authorities toward a more aggressive policy, sabotage peace initiatives, and stoke public opinion. Hence, influential actors—ranging from party leaders to generals and ideologists—within both countries use the conflict to consolidate their power and realize their agendas.

Some external players may also benefit from an intensification of Indo-Pakistani confrontation. Primarily, this concerns Pakistan’s closest ally—China. China indirectly benefits when Indian state attention and resources are diverted toward the western border. An escalation with Pakistan means India has fewer forces and resources to dedicate toward countering China in the Himalayas or curtailing Chinese influence in the region. Additionally, a crisis between New Delhi and Islamabad increases Pakistan's dependency on China—militarily, economically, and diplomatically. By supporting Islamabad during a challenging time, Beijing solidifies its influence in South Asia. It shouldn't be ruled out that some circles in the West might regard a limited escalation as advantageous: for example, strategists who believe that a severe confrontation with Pakistan would finally sever India from Russia and compel it to cooperate more closely with the U.S. and NATO. Nonetheless, open war is not in the interest of any responsible global leaders, as it carries too many risks. Thus, it is more about geopolitical rivals potentially exploiting an existing crisis for their own interests rather than deliberately provoking it. For instance, if India weakens, China would benefit; if Pakistan experiences international isolation, Indian partners in the West would gain from that. Another indirect beneficiary could be resource-exporting countries. If conflict leads to heightened oil prices (due to supply disruption risks in the Arabian Sea), oil-producing nations (such as some countries in the Persian Gulf) stand to earn significant revenue. Although these states publicly advocate for peace, in conditions of crisis, they do not suffer economically and sometimes even gain.

The defense industry and arms dealers. One of the few indisputable winners from the conflict is the global and national arms industry. India and Pakistan, feeling threatened by each other, spend enormous sums annually on the procurement and development of weapons. The higher the tension, the easier it becomes to justify new expenditures. After each escalation, new military projects are announced by both countries. For instance, following the 2019 crisis, India rapidly procured Russian S-400 air defense systems, French precision missiles, and accelerated the outfitting of its air force with modern fighters. Pakistan, in turn, activated negotiations with China for the procurement of new J-10 fighters and air defense systems. Global defense corporations—from American and European to Russian and Chinese—compete for the Indian and Pakistani markets, with the conflict ensuring stable demand for their products. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2010 and 2019, India imported weapons worth over $50 billion (the highest figure in the world), while Pakistan imported more than $11 billion. These colossal expenditures were a direct result of feeling threatened, with a significant portion ending up in the revenues of supplier companies. National defense sectors also reap advantages: India's “Make in India” program aimed at developing domestic production of tanks, aircraft, and ships is justified by the necessity of having an independent capacity to face Pakistan (and China). In Pakistan, military enterprises (factories in Wah, Tarbela, and the Kamra aviation complex) expand under state contracts justified again by the Indian threat. Military establishments invariably lobby for increased expenditures: India’s defense budget grows annually by about 8-10%, while Pakistan, despite financial difficulties, also maintains a significant share in its defense budget (around 4% of GDP in the 2020s, more than what it spends on education and healthcare). Thus, any new round of arms race fueled by escalation translates to profits for arms manufacturers. Their interest is that both sides continue to perceive threats and strive to surpass each other in strength.

In summary, one can conclude that conflict escalation creates its own “beneficiaries”—those who gain from the maintenance or increase of tensions. These include hawks in power and radicals outside of it for whom war is a means of achieving political goals; external powers that strategically benefit from the weakening of one of the rivals; and transnational and national arms manufacturers who profit from the arms race. Recognizing the presence of such interested parties makes it easier to understand why the conflict is so resilient: apart from objective reasons, there are also forces that do not desire full reconciliation as their influence or profit directly depend on the confrontation. Naturally, the benefits that these actors reap do not compare with the potential damage to the peoples of both countries and the world as a whole. However, they often hold levers of decision-making or possess loud voices, complicating the path to peaceful resolution.

Prospects for Conflict Resolution and Possible Scenarios

Resolving the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan is an extremely complex task, though not hopeless. Both countries officially declare their unwillingness for war and emphasize their openness to peaceful resolutions of contentious issues—but their views on such resolutions differ radically. The key to lasting peace lies primarily in resolving the Kashmir issue or, at least, creating conditions in which Kashmir ceases to be a cause for clashes. Theoretically, several paths for the future development of the situation can be envisaged—ranging from the worst to the most favorable:

1. Armed escalation (limited war). The most concerning scenario is that the current crisis erupts into open armed conflict. This can occur intentionally (if one side, for instance, India, decides to deliver a military strike in retaliation for a terrorist attack, and Pakistan responds symmetrically) or through a chain of errors and accidents. In a climate of heightened emotions, any provocation on the border, an aviation incident, or a sabotage act may become the “last straw.” A limited war is likely to begin in Kashmir: there may be a repeat of a situation similar to Kargil or a series of mutual strikes on border facilities. Both sides will try to localize hostilities to avoid full-scale confrontation, but controlling the course of the war is challenging. The limited war scenario entails several days or weeks of hostilities involving aviation, artillery, and armored vehicles, after which, under the pressure of great powers, the parties would realize the risk of further escalation and halt. While this outcome would result in human casualties and mutual destruction, it is likely not to affect major cities and would not escalate into the nuclear phase. It would effectively be a repetition of past border wars in new conditions. For the world, however, this option remains extremely dangerous: even a local war between India and Pakistan carries unpredictable turns and the possible loss of control over the situation.

2. A full-scale war with the threat of nuclear strikes. This is the worst-case scenario, which could unfold if a limited conflict spirals out of control. An escalating spiral could lead to each side conducting deeper strikes on the territory of the other, deploying their main forces. One could imagine that local fighting in Kashmir yields no clear results, prompting one side to extend the theater of military action— for example, India may launch an offensive in Punjab or strike at military installations near major Pakistani cities. In retaliation, Pakistan might employ tactical nuclear weapons against advancing forces or threaten strikes on a major city. India, adhering to its doctrine of massive retaliation, would strike back with strategic nuclear forces. The worst-case outcome would involve a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes, catastrophic for both countries and the entire world. The probability of such an outcome remains low: the understanding of mutual destruction should deter leaders from taking this step. However, the risk is not zero, and the further the conflict escalates, the harder it becomes to stop. If even a single nuclear weapon is employed, the international community would be forced to intervene in the harshest manner—possibly even through sanctions, isolating the guilty party, or even peacekeeping operations to prevent further catastrophe.

3. Continuation of the status quo (fragile peace and periodic crises). The most likely scenario, experts believe, is that the present state of affairs will continue without radical changes. This means that the current escalation could be diffused diplomatically—perhaps through mediation by third parties or through covert agreements under which India and Pakistan would step back from a dangerous precipice. A minimal level of communication would be restored (even if just formally), and the most acute measures would be lifted (for example, the Indus Waters Treaty would return to effect, ambassadors would be restored, and air travel would resume). However, a full-fledged dialogue...

4. De-escalation and gradual rapprochement (conditionally favorable scenario). Despite the depth of the contradictions, history shows examples where long-standing adversaries found paths to reduction. For India and Pakistan, the most optimistic scenario would imply the resumption of dialogue and the search for compromises. Under strong international pressure or following a change in political leadership (for instance, the rise of more moderate governments), the countries might agree to return to the negotiation table. Such a process could begin with small steps: restoring trade relations, exchanging prisoners, establishing agreements to prevent incidents on the border (a hotline between the military, meetings of commanders), and increasing the number of visas for citizens. Gradually, discussions could evolve toward key issues—most importantly, Kashmir. Many experts view the formalization of the existing Line of Control as an international border along with the provision of broad autonomy to both parts of Kashmir and guaranteed rights for their populations as a realistic solution. This approach would allow each side to save face: India formally retains its territory, Pakistan confirms its part, while the residents of Kashmir receive self-governance and the freedom to move across the Line of Control. Such ideas have been proposed before (there is evidence that in the mid-2000s, Pakistan’s leader Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were close to such a compromise). Implementing them would require massive trust and political will that are currently absent. Nevertheless, in the long run, circumstantial pressures—economic benefits of peace, fatigue from the arms race, fear of nuclear catastrophe—might push Delhi and Islamabad towards a more pragmatic approach. Individual experts believe that external factors—such as intensified threats from international terrorism or the need to jointly address the impacts of climate disasters—could eventually encourage Delhi and Islamabad to cooperate. Unofficial negotiations (so-called “track two diplomacy”), involving former officials and public figures from both countries, already periodically propose formulas for reconciliation. However, without political will at the highest level, these initiatives cannot be realized.

Assessing the prospects, it is fair to conclude that a quick resolution of the conflict is unlikely. The mutual distrust and internal barriers to compromise are still too great. In the near future, the most likely scenario is the preservation of the status quo with elements of a "cold peace": after de-escalating the current crisis, relations will remain tense, but open war will be avoided due to the deterrence factor of nuclear weapons and the pressure from the global community. However, this is a fragile "peace": any new terrorist attack or border incident could once again bring the two countries to a dangerous line. In the more distant future, the emergence of new leaders or changes in geopolitical circumstances (such as the waning of extremism, stabilization in Afghanistan, or the strengthening of regional organizations) could create conditions for dialogue. It is possible that both countries will gradually come to understand that perpetual enmity hampers their development and, as a result, a compromise that seems unimaginable today may become realistic. History shows that even the most profound contradictions can eventually be overcome—there are examples of reconciliation among former adversaries in other parts of the world. Whether India and Pakistan are able to follow this path largely depends on the political will of their leadership and pressure from societies weary of life in the shadow of war. In the near term, the main priority remains preventing unintentional escalation: it is necessary to maintain open communication channels between military commands (for which there is a direct line for addressing incidents on the border), and international players should be prepared to intervene promptly. The slightest error amid current tensions could lead to irreversible consequences. Therefore, caution, dialogue, and foresight are the only reasonable course for Delhi and Islamabad. Otherwise, the risk of disaster will persist continually. Ultimately, the fate of the region lies in the hands of its peoples and leaders: whether to continue the dangerous game on the brink of war or take steps toward peace and cooperation. The choice, although hindered by history and politics, remains possible.